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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to identify the class of all obviously strategy-proof and
onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Specically,
we consider social choice problems where a set of agents has to choose an alternative
from a nite and linearly ordered set of alternatives. For instance, when alternatives are
possible levels or locations of a public good, political partiesplatforms, temperatures in
a room, etc. In these cases, and in a broad variety of economic and political settings,
it is natural and meaningful to assume that agents have strict single-peaked preferences
over alternatives. A preference is single-peaked if there is a best alternative, or top, and
alternatives that are further away from this top are progressively less preferred. A central
result in the mechanism design literature studying strategy-proof social choice functions
on restricted domains of preferences is that a social choice function is strategy-proof and
onto on the domain of single-peaked preferences if and only if it is a generalized median
voter scheme.1
But in general, the mechanism design literature has mainly neglected the question of
how easy is for the agents to realize that truth-telling is indeed weakly dominant (i.e., how
much contingent reasoning is required to do so). Li (2017) proposes the notion of obvious
strategy-proofness as a criterion to deal with this question. Obvious strategy-proofness has
already been used to identify, among the class of strategy-proof mechanisms in di¤erent
settings, those mechanisms that are easy to playbecause truth-telling is an undoubtedly
optimal decision. Here, we answer the following question: what is the property that a
generalized median voter scheme has to satisfy to be obviously strategy-proof.
A social choice function is obviously strategy-proof if there exists an extensive game
form, whose set of players is the set of agents and its outcomes are alternatives (i.e.,
there exists a sequential mechanism), with two properties. First, for each preference
prole one can identify a prole of truth-telling (behavioral) strategies with the property
that if agents play the extensive game form according to it, the outcome of the game is
the alternative selected by the social choice function at the preference prole (i.e., the
extensive game form induces the social choice function). Second, agents use the two most
extreme behavioral assumptions when comparing the truth-telling strategy with any other
strategy; agents are absolutely pessimistic when assessing the consequence of truth-telling
and absolutely optimistic when assessing the consequence of any other behavior, and they
weakly prefer the former to the latter. Whenever an agent has to play along the sequential
mechanism, truth-telling appears then as being obviously optimal.
Obvious strategy-proofness is stronger than strategy-proofness. Hence, to describe
1See for instance Moulin (1980) or Barberà, Gül and Stacchetti (1993). Generalized median voter
schemes are extensions of the median voter rule and since they respect unanimity they are onto.
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the class of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of
single-peaked preferences we must restrict our search into the class of generalized median
voter schemes. A generalized median voter scheme can be described as a sequence of elec-
toral confrontations between pairs of correlative alternatives. Each electoral confrontation
is settled by a committee, a monotone family of winning coalitions, associated to one of
the two alternatives (call it x). Then, given a prole of single-peaked preferences, x is
selected if and only if the set of agents that prefer x to the other alternative belongs to
the committee. For instance, if the number of agents is odd, majority voting between two
alternatives is the committee that associates to one of the two alternatives all coalitions
with more than half of the agents. More specically, a generalized median voter scheme
can be represented by a coalition system that associates to each alternative a committee
and operates as follows. Fix a prole of single-peaked preferences over the set of alter-
natives.2 At any generic alternative x, and starting at the smallest one, agents face two
possibilities. Either to select the current alternative x as the one nally chosen or else
to select, tentatively, x + 1. If the set of agents that prefer x to x + 1, according to the
preference prole, is a winning coalition at x (that is, it is a member of the committee
at x), then x is selected, and nally chosen; otherwise, x + 1 becomes the new current
alternative that is confronted with x+ 2 by applying the committee at x+ 1.
Our contribution is two-fold. First, we give the explicit description of each obviously
strategy-proof and onto social choice function on the domain of single-peaked preferences.
We do it by showing that a generalized median voter scheme is obviously strategy-proof
if and only if its associated coalition system satises the increasing intersection property.
The property has two parts, both applied to each alternative and related with the car-
dinalities of the intersections of (minimal) winning coalitions. Second, we propose an
algorithm that, when applied to each coalition system with the increasing intersection
property, denes an extensive game form that implements in obviously dominant strate-
gies the corresponding social choice function. The algorithm is based on the description
of generalized median voter schemes as a sequence of electoral confrontations between
pairs of correlative alternatives and it uses the increasing intersection property of their
associated coalition systems.
Literature review
There is a large literature, prior to Li (2017), dealing with the di¢ culties that agents
might have when trying to identify that truth-telling is dominant in strategy-proof mech-
anisms. See for instance Attiyeh, Franciosi and Isaac (2000), Cason, Saijo, Sjöström and
Yamato (2006), Friedman and Schenker (1998), Kawagoe and Mori (2001) and Yama-
mura and Kawasaki (2013). Even earlier, Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987) interpret their
2Without loss of generality, we may assume that the set of alternatives is a nite set of correlative
integers.
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experimental results as suggesting that the breakdown of the equivalence between the
English ascending clock and the second-price sealed-bid auctions on a behavioral level
can be attributed to di¤erential information ows inherited in the structure of the two
auctions.Glazer and Rubinstein (1996) already argues that complexity considerations
may suggest the convenience of using extensive game forms to facilitate the identication
of the set of strategies that survive iterative elimination of dominated strategies.
Li (2017)s notion of obvious strategy-proofness is based on an extreme and strong
behavioral criterion. Thus, it is not surprising that the literature has already identied
settings for which either none of the strategy-proof social choice functions are obviously
strategy-proof or only a very special and small subset of them satisfy the stronger require-
ment. For instance, in the complete impossibility case, Li (2017) already shows that the
top-trading cycles algorithm in the house allocation problem of Shapley and Scarf (1974)
is not obviously strategy-proof. Ashlagi and Gonczarowski (2018) shows that the deferred
acceptance algorithm in the marriage model is not obviously strategy-proof for the agents
belonging to the o¤ering side.
In the partial (or total) possibility case, Li (2017) characterizes the monotone price
mechanisms (generalizations of ascending auctions) as those that are obviously strategy-
proof on the domain of quasi-linear preferences. Li (2017) also shows that, for online
advertising auctions, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is obviously strategy-proof.
Ashlagi and Gonczarowski (2018) shows however that the deferred acceptance algorithm
becomes obviously strategy-proof, for the agents belonging to the o¤ering side, on the
restricted domain of acyclic preferences introduced by Ergin (2002).3 Arribillaga, Massó
and Neme (2019) surprisingly nds that, for the discrete division problem with single-
peaked preferences, each sequential allotment rule (i.e., each strategy-proof, e¢ cient and
replacement monotonic social choice function) is indeed obviously strategy-proof. This
is shown by means of an algorithm that, for each sequential allotment rule, delivers the
extensive game form that implements the rule in obviously dominant strategies.
But the closest paper to ours is Bade and Gonczarowski (2017). They establish a gen-
eral revelation principle like result for obvious strategy-proofness: a social choice function
is implementable in obviously dominant strategies if and only if some obviously incentive
compatible gradual mechanism implements it. For the problem of assigning a set of ob-
jects to a set of agents, Bade and Gonczarowski (2017) shows that an e¢ cient social choice
function is obviously strategy-proof if and only if it can be implemented by an extensive
game form with sequential barters with lurkers; this class consists of generalizations of
serial dictatorships. They also show that Li (2017)s positive result on monotone price
mechanisms for binary allocation problems does not hold for more general problems with
3For other partially positive or revelation principle like results see also Bade and Gonczarowski (2017),
Pycia and Troyan (2018) and Troyan (2019).
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two or more goods. For the case of voting over two alternatives, Bade and Gonczarowski
(2017) shows that if a social choice function is obviously strategy-proof and onto then it
can be implemented by a proto-dictatorship. Finally, for the problem of an innite and
linearly ordered set of alternatives with single-peaked preferences, Bade and Gonczarowski
(2017) shows that if a social choice function is obviously strategy-proof and onto then it
can be implemented by an extensive game form consisting of dictatorships with safeguards
against extremisms (and arbitration via proto-dictatorships, if the set of alternatives is
discrete).
Bade and Gonczarowski (2017) and our paper have important overlaps regarding the
two-alternative case and the model with single-peaked preferences.4 The main di¤erences
between the two papers are the following. First, in the single-peaked case, our assumption
that the set of alternatives is nite is important and becomes crucial for the construction
of the algorithm. On the contrary, Bade and Gonczarowski (2017) assumes that the set
of alternatives is innite. Our nite assumption allows us to obtain the result for the
two-alternative case as a particular instance of our general result (see Corollary 1 and
subsequent comments in Section 6) without having to look at it as a separate model, as
in Bade and Gonczarowski (2017). Second, our approach, proposed extensive game forms
and proofs of the results di¤er from theirs because we formally describe and character-
ize obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions as generalized median voter
schemes. In contrast, Bade and Gonczarowski (2017) describe their class of dictatorships
with safeguards against extremisms directly and verbally. Third, in contrast with Bade
and Gonczarowski (2017), and the existing positive results described above (and except
the result in Arribillaga, Massó and Neme (2019)), our characterization is not a revela-
tion principle like result identifying a class of extensive game forms where, without loss
of generality (but not necessarily), the designer has to look for in order to implement in
obviously dominant strategies a particular and given social choice function. But these
revelation principle like results do not identify the specic mechanism, among all in the
class, that has to be used in order to implement that given social choice function; and
this is important because di¤erent mechanisms in the class may implement di¤erent social
choice functions. Instead, our proof is constructive. We propose and algorithm that, for
each obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice function, generates (and shows how
to construct) an extensive game form that implements the social choice function in obvi-
ously dominant strategies. For the important class of social choice functions dened on
the domain of single-peaked preferences, our characterization identies the increasing in-
tersection property as being necessary and su¢ cient for obvious strategy-proofness. Given
a generalized median voter scheme, one can easily check whether or not it is obviously
4We have obtained our results in an independent way, before knowing the existence of the rst version
of Bade and Gonczarowski (2017), as well as those of Pycia and Troyan (2018) and Mackenzie (2018).
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strategy-proof by using our property, since it is short and reasonably transparent.
To state and prove our results we will use two previous general results that simplify
the search for a specic extensive game form that can be used to implement in obviously
dominant strategies a given social choice function. First, we will use a revelation principle
like result saying that in our setting, and without loss of generality, we can assume that
the extensive game form that induces the social choice function has perfect information
(see Ashlagi and Gonczarowski (2018) and Mackenzie (2018)). Second, and following
Mackenzie (2018), the new notion of obvious strategy-proofness can be fully captured by
the classical notion of strategy-proofness applied to extensive form games with perfect
information. In addition, we use in one of our proofs the proto-dictatorship revelation
principle like result, established by Bade and Gonczarowski (2017) for the two-alternative
case.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic notation and denitions.
In Section 3 we present the notion of obvious strategy-proofness applied to our context.
In Section 4 we dene the increasing intersection property and state in Theorem 1 the
characterization result. In Section 5 we construct the algorithm that, taking as input
a generalized median voter scheme satisfying the increasing intersection property, gives
as output the extensive game form that implements it in obviously dominant strategies
(this result is stated in Theorem 2). In Section 6 we apply our general results to the two-
alternative case and/or to anonymous social choice functions. In Section 7 we conclude.
An Appendix collects the proofs of the two results, omitted in the main text.
2 Preliminaries
A set of agents N = f1; : : : ; ng, with n  2, has to choose an alternative from a nite and
linearly ordered set X = fx1; : : : ; xMg, with M  2. Without loss of generality, we will
often assume that X is the set of correlative integers f1; : : : ;Mg. Each agent i 2 N has a
strict preference Pi (a linear order) over X: We denote by Ri the weak preference over X
associated to Pi; i.e., for all x; y 2 X, xRiy if and only if either x = y or xPiy: There is a
rich literature studying this class of problems when agentspreferences are single-peaked.
Agent is preference Pi over X is single-peaked if (i) there exists t(Pi) 2 X, called the top
of Pi, such that t(Pi)Pix for all x 2 Xnft(Pi)g and (ii) for all x; y 2 X; x < y  t(Pi) or
t(Pi)  y < x implies yPix: Given i 2 N and x 2 X we write P xi to denote a generic single-
peaked preference such that t(P xi ) = x: Let P be the set of single-peaked preferences over
X:When jXj = 2; the linear order structure ofX plays no role and the set of single-peaked
preferences is simply the universal domain of strict preferences over X. A (preference)
prole is a n-tuple P = (P1; : : : ; Pn); an ordered list of n preferences, one for each agent.
Let PN be the set of single-peaked preference proles. Given P = (P1; : : : ; Pn) 2 PN ;
we denote the vector of tops at P by t(P ) = (t(P1); : : : ; t(Pn)): Given a prole P and an
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agent i; P i denotes the subprole in P i = PNnfig obtained by removing Pi from P:
A social choice function (SCF) f : PN ! X selects, for each preference prole P 2 PN ,
an alternative f(P ) 2 X:
A SCF f : PN ! X is strategy-proof (SP) if for all P 2 PN ; all i 2 N and all P 0i 2 P ;
f(Pi; P i)Rif(P 0i ; P i):
The literature refers to a strategy-proof SCF as being implementable in dominant strate-
gies (or SP-implementable) in the following sense. Let f : PN ! X be a SCF. Construct
its associated normal game form, where N is the set of players, P is the set of strategy
proles and f is the outcome function, mapping strategy proles into the set of alterna-
tives. Then, f is SP-implementable if the normal game form has the property that, for
all P 2 PN and all i 2 N , Pi is a weakly dominant strategy for i in the game in normal
form; where each i 2 N uses Pi to evaluate the outcomes of strategy proles. The normal
game form is known as the direct revelation mechanism that SP-implements f .
We dene several properties that a SCF f : PN ! X may satisfy and that we will use
in the sequel. We say that f is (i) onto if for each x 2 X there exists P 2 PN such that
f(P ) = x,5 and (ii) anonymous if for all P 2 PN and all one-to-one mapping  : N ! N;
f(P ) = f(P ) where, for all i 2 N; P i = P(i):
The description of the family of all strategy-proof and onto SCFs f : PN ! X is based
on the notion of a committee. Let 2N denote the family of all subsets of N (we call them
coalitions). A non-empty family C  2Nnf;g of non-empty coalitions is a committee if it
is (coalition) monotonic in the sense that for each pair S; T  N such that S 2 C and
S ( T , we have T 2 C. Coalitions in C are called winning. Given C, denote by Cm the
family of minimal winning coalitions of C; namely,
Cm = fS 2 C j there is no S 0 2 C such that S 0 ( Sg:
Observe that specifying Cm is enough to completely determine C.
We dene now a class of SCFs, known as generalized median voter schemes, by means
of a coalition system. A family of committees fCxgx2X , one for each alternative in X, is a
coalition system if (i) it is (outcome) monotonic in the sense that, for each pair x; x0 2 X
such that x < x0, S 2 Cx implies S 2 Cx0, and (ii) CM = 2Nnf;g.
Denition 1 A SCF f : PN ! X is a generalized median voter scheme if there exists
a coalition system fCxgx2X such that, for all P 2 PN ;
f(P ) = x if and only if (i) fi 2 N j t(Pi)  xg 2 Cx and
(ii) for all x0 < x; fi 2 N j t(Pi)  x0g =2 Cx0 :
5A SCF f : PN ! X is unanimous if, for all P 2 PN such that t(Pi) = x for all i 2 N; f(P ) = x.
Although ontoness is weaker than unanimity, it is easy to see that among the class of all strategy-proof
SCFs, the classes of unanimous and onto SCFs coincide.
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Namely, the alternative x selected by the generalized median voter scheme f at P is
the smallest one for which the top alternatives of all agents of a winning coalition at x
are smaller than or equal to x.6
Alternatively, and more metaphorically, a generalized median voter scheme described
by a coalition system might be understood as a force that, starting at the lowest alter-
native, pushes up towards the highest possible alternative. However, the coalition system
distributes among agents the power to stop this force in such a way that all members of
a winning coalition at x can make sure that, by declaring that their top alternative is
smaller than or equal to x, the pushing force of f will not overcome x.
It is well-known that a SCF f : PN ! X is strategy-proof and onto if and only if f is
a generalized median voter scheme.7 By denition, all generalized median voter schemes
are unanimous, and so they are onto.
Example 1 contains a generalized median voter scheme that illustrates Denition 1
and that we will use in the sequel.
Example 1 Assume X = fx1; x2; x3g and n = 5. Consider the coalition system C =
fCx1 ; Cx2 ; Cx3g where
Cmx1 = ff1g; f2; 3; 4g; f2; 3; 5gg
Cmx2 = ff1g; f2g; f3g; f4; 5gg
Cmx3 = ff1g; f2g; f3g; f4g; f5gg;
and let f : PN ! X be the generalized median voter scheme dened by C = fCx1 ; Cx2 ; Cx3g:
Consider any prole P 2 PN whose vector of tops is t(P ) = (x3; x1; x2; x1; x3): Then, since
fi 2 N j t(Pi)  x1g = f2; 4g =2 Cx1 and fi 2 N j t(Pi)  x2g = f2; 3; 4g 2 Cx2, f(P ) = x2.
Consider now any prole P 0 2 PN whose vector of tops is t(P 0) = (x3; x1; x1; x1; x3): Then,
since fi 2 N j t(P 0i )  x1g = f2; 3; 4g 2 Cx1, f(P 0) = x1. 
3 Obvious strategy-proofness
We briey describe the notion of obvious strategy-proofness, adapted to our setting. Li
(2017) proposes this notion with the aim of reducing the contingent reasoning required by
agents to identify that truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy. A SCF f : PN ! X
6The term generalized median voter scheme is used in the literature to refer to a minimax rule (intro-
duced in Moulin (1980) for the case X = R [ f 1;+1g) when applied to a nite and multidimensional
set of alternatives; see for instance Barberà, Gül and Stacchetti (1993) or Barberà, Massó and Neme
(1997). Since we represent strategy-proof SCFs on the domain of single-peaked preferences by means of
coalition systems (instead of using the equivalent representation by collections of xed ballots, as rst
used by Moulin (1980)), we adopt this terminology here.
7See Barberà, Gül and Stacchetti (1993).
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is obviously strategy-proof if there exists an extensive game form  , with N as the set of
players and X as the set of outcomes, with two properties. First, for each prole P =
(P1; : : : ; Pn) 2 PN one can identify a behavioral strategy prole, to be interpreted as being
truth-telling, such that if agents played   according to such strategy the outcome would be
f(P ); the alternative selected by the SCF f at P ; that is,   induces f . Second, whenever
agent i with preference Pi has to play at a history in  , i evaluates the consequence of
choosing the action prescribed by is truth-telling strategy according to the worse possible
outcome, among all outcomes that may occur as an e¤ect of later actions made by the
other agents along the rest of  . In contrast, i evaluates the consequence of choosing an
action di¤erent from the one prescribed by is truth-telling strategy according to the best
possible outcome, among all outcomes that may occur again as an e¤ect of later actions
chosen by the other agents along the rest of  . Then, is truth-telling strategy is obviously
dominant in   if, at all histories where i has to play, its pessimistic outcome is at least
as preferred as the optimistic outcome used to evaluate any other strategy. If   induces
f and for each agent truth-telling is obviously dominant, then f is obviously strategy-
proof. Obvious strategy-proofness is stronger than strategy-proofness (see Corollary 1 in
Li (2017)).
Two important simplications related to obvious strategy-proofness have been iden-
tied in the literature that follows from Li (2017), and that we can use in our context.
First, without loss of generality we can assume that the extensive game form that induces
the rule has perfect information (see Ashlagi and Gonczarowski (2018) and Mackenzie
(2018)). Second, the new notion of obvious strategy-proofness can be fully captured by
the classical notion of strategy-proofness applied to extensive form games with perfect
information. This last observation essentially follows from the fact that, the best possible
outcome obtained when agent i chooses an action di¤erent from the one prescribed by is
truth-telling strategy and the worst possible outcome obtained when agent i chooses the
action prescribed by is truth-telling strategy, are both obtained with only one strategy
prole of the other agents. This holds because the perfect information implies that all in-
formation sets are singleton sets (and each one belongs to either the subgame that follows
the truth-telling choice or else to the subgame that follows the alternative choice).8 Then,
for easy presentation and following this literature, we will say that a SCF is obviously
strategy-proof if it is implemented by an extensive game form with perfect information
for which truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy (see Denition 2 below). We present
the general notion of an extensive game form that will be used here to state and prove
our results.
8Mackenzie (2018) formally proves this statement for a special class of extensive game forms with
perfect information, called round table mechanisms, but its proof can be adapted to any extensive game
form with perfect information.
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An extensive game form with perfect information associated to (N;X) consists of the
following elements.
1. A nite and partially ordered set of histories (H;), where:
(a) ; 2 H is the empty history for which ;  h for all h 2 Hnf;g:
(b) For each h 2 Hnf;g; there is a unique h0, the immediate predecessor of h, such
that h0  h and there is no h such that h0  h  h (that is, (H;) can be seen
as a rooted tree).
(c) H can be partitioned into two sets, the set of terminal histories HT = fh 2
H jthere is no h 2 H such that h  hg and the set of non-terminal histories
HNT = fh 2 H jthere is h 2 H such that h  hg.
2. A mapping N : HNT ! N that assigns to each non-terminal history h 2 HNT the
agent N (h) that has to play at history h: For each i 2 N , dene Hi = fh 2 HNT j
N (h) = ig:
3. A set of actionsA and a correspondenceA : HNT  Anf;g where, for each h 2 HNT ,
A(h) is the non-empty set of actions available to player N (h) at h:
4. An outcome function o : HT ! X that assigns an alternative o(h) 2 X to each
terminal history h 2 HT .
An extensive game form with perfect information associated to (N;X) is a six-tuple
  = (N;X; (H;) ;N ;A; o) with the above properties.9 The set of agents N and the set
of alternatives X will be xed throughout the paper. Let G be the class of all extensive
game forms satisfying conditions 1 to 4 above.10
Fix an extensive game form   2 G and an agent i 2 N: A (behavioral and pure)
strategy of i in   is a function i : Hi ! A such that, for each h 2 Hi; i(h) 2 A(h);
namely, i selects at each history h where i has to play one of is available actions at h. Let
i be the set of is strategies in  : A strategy prole  = (1; : : : ; n) 2 1  n  
is an ordered list of strategies, one for each agent. Given i 2 N;  2  and 0i 2 i we
9Note that the set of actions A is embedded in the denition of A. Moreover,   is not yet a game
in extensive form because agentspreferences over alternatives are still unspecied. But given a game  
and a preference prole P; the pair ( ; P ) denes a game in extensive form where each agent i uses Pi to
evaluate alternatives, associated to terminal histories, induced by strategy proles.
10According to Mackenzie (2018) a game   2 G is a round table mechanism if the set of actions A is the
family of all non-empty subsets of preference relations 2Pnf;g and (i) the set of actions at any history
are disjoint subsets of preferences, (ii) when a player has to play for the rst time the set of actions is a
partition of P, and (iii) later, the set of actions at history h is the intersection of the actions taken by
agent N (h) at all predecessors that lead to h.
10
often write (0i;  i) to denote the strategy prole where i is replaced in  by 
0
i: Let
h () be the terminal history that results in   when agents play   according to  2 .
Fix an extensive game form   2 G and a preference Pi 2 P. A strategy i is weakly
dominant in   at Pi if, for all  i and all 0i,
o(h (i;  i))Rio(h (0i;  i)):
We are now ready to dene obvious strategy-proofness in our context.
Denition 2 A SCF f : PN ! X is obviously strategy-proof if there is an extensive
game form   2 G associated to (N;X) such that, for each P 2 PN , there exists a strategy
prole P = (P11 ; : : : ; 
Pn
n ) 2  with the properties that
(i) f(P ) = o(h (P )) and
(ii) for all i 2 N and all Pi 2 P ; Pii is weakly dominant in   at Pi.
When (i) holds we say that   induces f: When (i) and (ii) hold we say that   OSP-
implements f:
4 The increasing intersection property and the char-
acterization result
We present the key denition of the paper and our characterization of the class of all
obviously strategy-proof and onto SCFs on the domain of single-peaked preferences. To
state the property and the result, we need the following notation.
For each x 2 X; let kx denote the cardinality of the coalitions in Cmx with maximal
cardinality; namely,
kx = maxfjSj 2 f1; : : : ; ng j S 2 Cmx g:
For any k  1; denote by Ikx the intersection of the coalitions in Cmx with cardinality
greater than or equal to k; namely,
Ikx =
\
S2Cmx :jSjk
S:
Of course, Ikx = ; for all k > kx: By convention, we set I0x = ;. In Example 1, kx1 = 3,
kx2 = 2, kx3 = 1; and I1x1 = ;; I2x1 = I3x1 = f2; 3g; I1x2 = ;; I22 = f4; 5g and I1x3 = ;:
Denition 3 A coalition system fCxgx2X satises the Increasing Intersection (InIn)
property if, for each x 2 f1; : : : ;M   1g,
(a)
Ikx   k   1 for all k  kx; and
(b) if kx > 1; there exists i 2 I2x such that I1x+1 [ fig 2 Cmx+1:
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To describe the denition, and its role in our results, x an alternative x and let kx
be the largest cardinality of minimal winning coalitions in the committee at x. Part (a)
requires that, for each integer k  kx, the cardinality of the intersection of all coalitions
with more than k agents that belong to the committee at x is larger than or equal to
k   1; namely, all minimal winning coalitions at x of a given cardinality can diverge at
most by one agent. This property will allow us to distinguish, at each alternative x, those
agents that are able to impose x in its pairwise electoral confrontation with a contiguous
alternative, from those that are able to veto x (and so, transforming the contiguous
alternative with the one used as reference in the new electoral confrontation). Part (b)
requires that if the committee at x has a winning coalition with at least two agents, then
the committee at x + 1 contains a minimal winning coalition formed by an agent that
belongs to all minimal winning coalitions with more than two agents at x (such agent does
exist by part (a)) and all agents that belong to all minimal winning coalitions at x + 1.
This property ensures that the agent that has the power to veto the current alternative
will not regret of doing so because the agent will have the power to make the new current
alternative the nally selected one, if the agent wishes to do so.
Theorem 1 A social choice function f : PN ! X is obviously strategy-proof and onto
if and only if f is a generalized median voter scheme whose associated coalition system
C = fCxgx2X satises the increasing intersection property.
Proof See the Appendix.
The proof of the su¢ ciency part of Theorem 1 will be constructive. For each gen-
eralized median voter scheme f whose associated coalition system C satises the (InIn)
property we will construct an extensive game form  C that OSP-implements f . In Section
5 below we will dene an algorithm that takes C as input and delivers as output the exten-
sive game form  C. However, before moving to Section 5, we illustrate the (InIn) property,
introduce additional notation, and present a preliminary result and another example.
Given a coalition system fCxgx2X we say that condition (a) of the (InIn) property
holds at x if (a) holds for x 2 X: Similarly for (b). We will say that the (InIn) property
holds at x if conditions (a) and (b) hold at x. We say that a generalized median voter
scheme satises the (InIn) property if its associated coalition system satises it.
The agent identied in condition (b) of the (InIn) property is not necessarily unique,
and we denote one of such agents by ix; for instance, in Example 1, ix1 could be agent 2
or 3 and ix2 could be agent 4 or 5:11
Example 1 (continued) The two tables below might help the reader to check that
11Whenever we want to identify a single agent satisfying a property that several agents may satisfy, we
could select the smallest agent (according to the order 1 <    < n) among the set of agents that satisfy
the property, and this will be without loss of generality.
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the coalition system C = fCx1 ; Cx2 ; Cx3g of Example 1 satises the (InIn) property.
x1; k
x1 = 3 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
Intersections I1x1 = ; I2x1 = f2; 3g I3x1 = f2; 3g
(a) of (InIn)
I1x1 = 0  0 I2x1 = 2 > 1 I3x1 = 2  2
(b) of (InIn) ix1 2 f2; 3g and I1x2 [ fix1g = f;g [ fix1g 2 Cmx2
x2; k
x2 = 2 k = 1 k = 2
Intersections I1x2 = ; I2x2 = f4; 5g
(a) of (InIn)
I1x2 = 0  0 I2x2 = 2 > 1
(b) of (InIn) ix2 2 f4; 5g and I1x3 [ fix2g = f;g [ fix2g 2 Cmx3

Remark 1 Let fCxgx2X be a coalition system. Then, the following properties hold.
(1.1) If kx = 1; the (InIn) property holds at x: To see that, observe that kx = 1 implies
Cmx  ffig j i 2 Ng. Hence, 0  jI1xj  1 and condition (a) of the (InIn) property holds
at x. Moreover, since kx = 1, condition (b) of the (InIn) property at x does not apply.
(1.2) If jCmx j = 1, condition (a) of the (InIn) property holds at x. To see that, let S be the
unique coalition in Cmx . Hence, kx = jSj and, for all k  kx, Ikx = S: Then, for all k  kx,Ikx  = jSj = kx > k   1.
(1.3) If X = fx1; x2g; condition (b) of the (InIn) property holds at x1. This is because
I1x2 = ; and fig 2 Cmx2 for all i 2 N .
To highlight the additional requirements of obvious strategy-proofness with respect
to strategy-proofness, we exhibit a simple example with a SCF that is SP but not OSP-
implementable.
Example 2 Assume X = fx; x + 1g and n = 5. Consider the SCF f : PN ! X
dened by the coalition system C = fCx; Cx+1g; where Cmx = ff1; 2g; f1; 3g; f4; 5gg and
Cx+1 = 2Nnf;g: We already know that f is SP-implementable because it is a generalized
median voter scheme but f is not OSP-implementable because it does not satisfy the
(InIn) property because kx = 2 and jI2xj = 0 < 1 = kx   1: In the direct revelation
mechanism that SP-implements f , truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy: to give
support to the top is always optimal independently of whether or not the top is selected.
In contrast, consider any extensive game form   that could OSP-implement f . The notion
requires that (i)   induces f and (ii) truth-telling is weakly (i.e., obviously) dominant in
 . In the example, (i) requires that the agent that has to move rst in   has to have
available two actions, both inducing x and x+1 as possible outcomes, since for all i 2 N ,
it holds simultaneously that fig =2 Cx (i can not impose x) and there exists S 2 Cmx such
that i =2 S (i can not impose x + 1). But then, for the agent that has to move rst the
outcome associated to the optimistic view of not truth-telling is strictly preferred to the
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outcome associated to the pessimistic view of truth-telling, and so truth-telling is not
an obvious optimal decision for this agent. SCFs that are OSP-implementable have to
exclude this possibility. The (InIn) property is the condition that does that, and so it
discriminates the SCFs that are OSP-implementable from those that are not. 
5 The extensive game form
To prove the necessity part of Theorem 1, we will dene an algorithm that takes each
coalition system C satisfying the (InIn) property and delivers an extensive game form  C
that OSP-implements the generalized median voter scheme associated to C. The algorithm
will be based on a collection of elections confronting x and x + 1 (for x < M) by means
of an extensive form game, dened also by an algorithm and denoted by  x. The specic
sequence along which these elections take place will be determined later, in Subsection
5.2.
To proceed, and given a committee Cx, we need the following notation. For each
k  kx; let F kx be the subset of agents not in Ikx with the property that each of them
completes, together with those in Ikx , a minimal winning coalition at x; namely,
F kx = fi 2 NnIkx j Ikx [ fig 2 Cmx g: (1)
By convention, we set F 0x = ;: It can be shown that if condition (a) of the (InIn) property
holds at x, each minimal winning coalition at x can be written as the union of Ikx and fig
for some k  kx and i 2 F kx , or just as Ikxx (see (f) and (g) in Remark 2 at the beginning
of the Appendix). Moreover, for all 1 < k  kx;
if F kx nF k 1x = ; then either F kx = ; or F kx = F k 1x : (2)
To see that, assume F kx 6= ;. Since F kx nF k 1x = ;; i 2 F kx implies that i 2 F k 1x :
Therefore, by denition of F kx ; I
k
x [ fig 2 Cmx and i =2 Ikx imply Ik 1x [ fig 2 Cmx and
i =2 Ik 1x . Since Ik 1x  Ikx ; Ik 1x = Ikx ; otherwise, there would exists i 2 IkxnIk 1x such that
Ik 1x [ fig ( Ikx [ fig, contradicting that Ikx [ fig 2 Cmx . Therefore, by (1), F kx = F k 1x :
Example 3 contains a committee Cx that illustrates the above denition, and that we
will use in the sequel.
Example 3 Let n = 10 and Cmx = ff1g; f2; 3g; f2; 4g; f2; 5; 6g; f2; 5; 7; 8; 9g; f2; 5; 7; 8; 10gg.
Note that kx = 5: Then,
I1x = ; F 1x = f1g
I2x = f2g F 2x = f3; 4g
I3x = f2; 5g F 3x = f6g
I4x = f2; 5; 7; 8g F 4x = f9; 10g
I5x = f2; 5; 7; 8g F 5x = f9; 10g:
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Observe that condition (a) of the (InIn) property holds at x since kx = 5 > 1 and
jI1xj = 0  0; jI2xj = 1  1; jI3xj = 2  2; jI4xj = 4  3 and jI5xj = 4  4 hold. Moreover,
any S 2 Cmx can be written as S = Ikx [ fig for some i 2 F kx and k  kx. 
5.1 The algorithm confronting x and x+ 1 (for x < M)
Here, we focus only on the election confronting x and x+ 1, for x < M , by means of Cx.
Fix Cx. The algorithm consists of two types of Stages, A and B, that are played
alternately, and each with (potentially) several steps. Agents play sequentially at most
once, and when they do, their choice set is fx; x + 1g. Agents playing in steps of Stage
A (agents belonging to I1x; : : : ; I
kx
x ) can either impose x + 1 (by choosing x + 1) or let
the extensive game form proceed (by choosing x). Agents playing in steps of Stage B
(agents belonging to the sets F 1x ; : : : ; F
kx
x ) can either impose x (by choosing x) or let the
extensive game form proceed (by choosing x+ 1). The agent playing in the last step can
impose x (by choosing x) or x+ 1 (by choosing x+ 1).
The algorithm dening the extensive game form  x
Input : A committee Cx satisfying condition (a) of the (InIn) property at x.
Initialization: Identify the integer kx and, for each 1  k  kx, the subsets of agents Ikx
and F kx . Set k = 1 and go to Stage A.1.
Stage A.k (1  k  kx).
If IkxnIk 1x 6= ;, agents in IkxnIk 1x play sequentially in any order choosing an action in
the set fx; x+ 1g.
If one agent chooses x+ 1,  x ends with outcome x+ 1.
If all agents choose x; go to Stage B.k:
If IkxnIk 1x = ;, go to Stage B.k.
Stage B.k (1  k  kx).
(i) Assume 1  k < kx:
If F kx nF k 1x 6= ;, agents in F kx nF k 1x play sequentially in any order choosing an
action in the set fx; x+ 1g.
If one agent chooses x,  x ends with outcome x.
If all agents choose x+ 1, go to Stage A.k+1.
If F kx nF k 1x = ;, go to Stage A.k+1.
(ii) Assume k = kx:
If F kx nF k 1x 6= ;, agents in F kx nF k 1x play sequentially in any order choosing an
action in the set fx; x+ 1g.
If one agent chooses x,  x ends with outcome x.
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If all agents choose x+ 1,  x ends with outcome x+ 1:
If F kx nF k 1x = ;:
If F kx = ;,  x ends with outcome x:
If F kx = F
k 1
x 6= ;;  x ends with outcome x+ 1:12
Output :  x:
The extensive game form  x is a proto-dictatorship, as dened by Bade and Gonczarowski
(2017). Each agent plays at most once by choosing either x or x + 1 and, except for the
last player, one and only one of the two choices induces a terminal history while for the
last player both choices induce a terminal history.
Example 3 (continued) Figure 1 represents the extensive game form  x for the com-
mittee Cx of Example 3, where agents play from left to right, with the order 1; : : : ; 10,
and the set of actions is fx; x+ 1g for all agents.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
x x+ 1 x x x+ 1 x x+ 1 x+ 1 x x
x+ 1 x x+ 1 x+ 1 x x+ 1 x x x+ 1 x+ 1
x x+ 1 x x x+ 1 x x+ 1 x+ 1 x x
x+ 1
Figure 1
Below, we apply the algorithm to Cx to obtain  x depicted in Figure 1.
At Stage A.1, since I1x = ;, go to Stage B.1. At Stage B.1, since F 1x = f1g, only 1
plays. If 1 chooses x,  x ends with x, and if 1 chooses x+1, go to Stage A.2. At Stage
A.2, since I2xnI1x = f2g, only 2 plays. If 2 chooses x + 1,  x ends with x + 1, and if 2
chooses x, go to Stage B.2. At Stage B.2, since F 2xnF 1x = f3; 4g, 3 and 4 play (in Figure
1, 3 plays before 4). If 3 chooses x,  x ends with x, and if 3 chooses x + 1, 4 plays. If 4
chooses x,  x ends with x, and if 4 chooses x+1, go to Stage A.3. At Stage A.3, since
I3xnI2x = f5g, only 5 plays. If 5 chooses x + 1,  x ends with x + 1, and if 5 chooses x, go
to Stage B.3. At Stage B.3, since F 3xnF 2x = f6g, only 6 plays. If 6 chooses x,  x ends
with x, and if 6 chooses x + 1, go to Stage A.4. At Stage A.4, since I4xnI3x = f7; 8g, 7
and 8 play (in Figure 1, 7 plays before 8). If 7 chooses x + 1,  x ends with x + 1, and
if 7 chooses x, 8 plays. If 8 chooses x + 1,  x ends with x + 1, and if 8 chooses x, go to
Stage B.4. At Stage B.4, since F 4xnF 3x = f9; 10g, 9 and 10 play (in Figure 1, 9 plays
before 10). If 9 chooses x,  x ends with x, and if 9 chooses x + 1, agent 10 plays. If 10
chooses x,  x ends with x, and if 10 chooses x+1, go to Stage A.5. At Stage A.5, since
12By (2), these two cases are the only possible ones.
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I5xnI4x = ;; go to Stage B.5. At Stage B.5, since k = kx = 5 and F 5x = F 4x = f9; 10g;  x
ends with outcome x+ 1 and the algorithm stops after Stage B.5 with output  x. 
5.2 The extensive game form  C
This subsection contains the description of the algorithm dening the full extensive game
form that OSP-implements a given generalized median voter scheme f : PN ! X sat-
isfying the (InIn) property. This description will require to identify, given the coalition
system fCxgx2X associated to f , (i) the smallest alternative x 2 X with the property
that its committee Cx has a singleton set and (ii) one of the agents that alone is a minimal
winning coalition at x, denoted by i. Namely,
x = argminfx 2 X j fig 2 Cmx for some i 2 Ng:
The alternative x is well dened since CmM = ff1g; : : : ; fngg. Dene13
i =
(
argminfi 2 N j fig 2 Cmxg if x = 1
ix
 1 otherwise.
The algorithm dening the extensive game form  C
Input: A coalition system fCxgx2X satisfying the (InIn) property.
Initialization: Identify the alternative x, the agent i and, for each x < M; the integer
kx, the agent ix (if kx > 1) and, for each 1  k  kx, the subsets of agents Ikx and F kx .
Go to Stage I.
Stage I. The rst agent to play is N (;) = i choosing an action in the set A(;), where
A(;) =
8><>:
fx; x + 1g if x = 1
fx   1; x; x + 1g if 1 < x < M
fx   1; xg if x =M:
If i chooses x,  C ends with outcome x.
If i chooses x + 1; go to Stage Up.1.
If i chooses x   1; go to Stage Down.1.
Stage Up.k (k  1). Set x = x + (k   1):
(i) Assume x+ 1 < M .
If kx > 1; agents play  x as previously dened except that in Stage A.2, agent
13If x > 1; kx
 1 > 1 holds since no singleton coalition belongs to Cmx 1: Observe also that, since
condition (b) of the (InIn) property holds at x   1, fix 1g 2 Cmx because, by the denitions of x and
ix
 1, either I1x = ; or I1x = fix
 1g and so Cmx = ffix
 1gg.
17
ix 2 I2xnI1x plays rst.14
If ix chooses x+ 1, go to Stage Up.k+1.
If ix chooses x, the other agents in I2x n I1x play sequentially, in any order.
The outcome of  x is the outcome of  C:
If kx = 1; agents play  x.
If the outcome of  x is x; then  C ends with outcome x:
If the outcome of  x is x+ 1, go to Stage Up.k+1:
(ii) Assume x+ 1 =M . Agents play  x and the outcome of  x is the outcome of  C.
Stage Down.k (k  1). Set x = x   k:
(i) Assume x > 1:
If jCmx j > 1; agents play  x as previously dened except that in Stage B.1 agent
ix 1 2 F 1x plays rst.15
If ix 1 chooses x, go to Stage Down.k+1.
If ix 1 chooses x+ 1, the other agents in F 1x play sequentially, in any order.
The outcome of  x is the outcome of  C.
If jCmx j = 1; agents play  x.
If the outcome of  x is x+ 1; then  C ends with outcome x+ 1:
If the outcome of  x is x, go to Stage Down.k+1:
(ii) Assume x = 1: Agents play  x and the outcome of  x is the outcome of  C.
Output :  C:
The following gures represent the building blocks that make up the algorithm.
Stage I.
If 1 < x < M
r r r
r
Stage Down.1 Stage Up.1
x   1 x + 1
x
x
i
14Observe that since kx > 1, x  x < M; and condition (b) of the (InIn) property holds at x, we have
that I1x = ; and ix 2 I2xnI1x:
15Observe that, since 1 < x < x and condition (b) of the (InIn) property holds at x  1, we have that
fix 1g =2 Cmx and I1x [ fix 1g 2 Cmx . Since jCmx j > 1, I1x =2 Cmx holds, and so ix 1 =2 I1x and ix 1 2 F 1x :
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If x = 1 If x =M
r r
r
Stage Up.1
x + 1
x
x
i r r
r
Stage Down.1
x   1
x
x
i
Stage Up.k. For x = x + (k   1)
... ...r r r r r r r r r
r r r r r
r
Stage Up.k+1
x x x+ 1 x
x+ 1 x+ 1 x
x+1 x+ 1 x x+ 1
ix
Stages A.1 and B.1 in  x Stage A.2 in  x Remaining stages in  x
Stage Down.k. For x = x   k
... ...r r r r r r r r r
r r r r r
r
Stage Down.k+1
x x x x+ 1
x+ 1 x+ 1 x+ 1
x+ 1 x+ 1 x+ 1 x
ix 1
Stage A.1 in  x Stage B.1 in  x Remaining stages in  x
The algorithm can be seen as a sequence of electoral confrontations between x and x+1,
each by means of  x: However, obvious strategy-proofness requires that the transition from
 x to  x+1, if x  x, or from  x to  x 1, if x < x, can not just depend on the outcome
of  x. When  x is played in an up stage (i.e., x  x), and the outcome of  x is x + 1
after ix chooses x; the overall game  C does not move to  x+1 but instead it nishes with
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nal outcome x + 1: Similarly, when  x is played in a down stage (i.e., x < x), and the
outcome of  x is x after ix 1 chooses x + 1; the overall game  C does not move to  x 1
but instead it nishes with nal outcome x: Observe that by denitions of ix and ix 1
the outcome of  x is respectively x + 1 if x  x and ix chooses x + 1 or x if x < x
and ix 1 chooses x; and then the corresponding  x+1 or  x 1 will be played after  x. To
preserve obvious strategy-proofness, agent ix or agent ix 1 has to be the rst to choose
respectively in the corresponding stages A.2 or B.1 of  x.
We now illustrate the algorithm by applying it to the coalition system C = fCx1 ; Cx2 ; Cx3g
of Example 1. We have already checked that C satises the (InIn) property.
Example 1 (continued) Remember that X = fx1; x2; x3g; n = 5,
Cmx1 = ff1g; f2; 3; 4g; f2; 3; 5gg
Cmx2 = ff1g; f2g; f3g; f4; 5gg
Cmx3 = ff1g; f2g; f3g; f4g; f5gg
and, without loss of generality, assume x2 = x1 + 1 and x3 = x2 + 1:
The application of the algorithm to obtain  C (see Figure 2 below)
Input: The coalition system C = fCx1 ; Cx2 ; Cx3g that satises the (InIn) property.
Initialization: Identify the alternative x = x1, the agent i = 1; and the cardinalities,
subsets of agents and agents shown in the table below.
x1
kx1 = 3
I1x1 = ; F 1x1 = f1g
I2x1 = f2; 3g F 2x1 = f4; 5g
I3x1 = f2; 3g F 3x1 = f4; 5g
ix1 = 2
x2
kx2 = 2
I1x2 = ; F 1x2 = f1; 2; 3g
I2x2 = f4; 5g F 2x2 = ;
ix2 = 4
x3
kx3 = 1
I1x3 = ; F 1x3 = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g:
Go to Stage I.
Stage I. Agent 1 is the rst to play choosing an action in the set fx1; x2g:
If 1 chooses x1,  C ends with outcome x1.
If 1 chooses x2; go to Stage Up.1.
Stage Up.1. Set x = x1.
Since x2 < x3 and kx1 = 3 > 1; agents play  x1 with the modication that ix1 = 2
plays rst in Stage A.2.
 x1
Stage A.1. Since I1x1nI0x1 = ;, go to Stage B.1.
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Stage B.1. Since kx1 = 3 > 1 and F 1x1nF 0x1 = f1g, agent 1 plays choosing an action
in the set fx1; x2g:
If 1 chooses x1;  C ends with outcome x1:
If 1 chooses x2, go to Stage A.2.
Stage A.2. Since I2x1nI1x1 = f2; 3g and ix1 = 2, agents 2 and 3 play in this order by
choosing an action in the set fx1; x2g.
If 2 chooses x2, go to Stage Up.2.
If 2 chooses x1, 3 plays.
If 3 chooses x2;  C ends with outcome x2:
If 3 chooses x1, go to Stage B.2.
Stage B.2. Since kx1 = 3 > 2 and F 2x1nF 1x1 = f4; 5g, agents 4 and 5 play in any other
by choosing an action in the set fx1; x2g. Set the order 4; 5.
If 4 chooses x1;  C ends with outcome x1.
If 4 chooses x2; 5 plays.
If 5 chooses x1;  C ends with outcome x1.
If 5 chooses x2; go to Stage A.3.
Stage A.3. Since I3x1nI2x1 = ;; go to Stage B.3.
Stage B.3. Since kx1 = 3 and F 3x1 = F
1
x1
= f4; 5g,  C ends with x2:
Stage Up.2. Set x = x2.
Since x2 + 1 = x3; agents play  x2 and the outcome of  x2 is the outcome of  C.
 x2
Stage A.1. Since I1x2nI0x2 = ;, go to Stage B.1.
Stage B.1. Since kx2 = 2 > 1 and F 1x2nF 0x2 = f1; 2; 3g; agents 1, 2 and 3 play in any
order by choosing an action in the set fx2; x3g: Set the order 1; 2; 3:
If 1 chooses x2,  C ends with outcome x2.
If 1 chooses x3, 2 plays.
If 2 chooses x2,  C ends with outcome x2.
If 2 chooses x3; 3 plays.
If 3 chooses x2,  C ends with outcome x2.
If 3 chooses x3; go to Stage A.2.
Stage A.2. Since I2x2nI1x2 = f4; 5g, agents 4 and 5 play in any order by choosing and
action in the set fx2; x3g: Set the order 4; 5:
If 4 chooses x3;  C ends with outcome x3:
If 4 chooses x2; 5 plays.
If 5 chooses x3;  C ends with outcome x3:
If 5 chooses x2; go to Stage B.2.
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Stage B.2. Since kx2 = 2 and F 2x2 = ;,  C ends with outcome x2.
Output :  C:
Figure 2 depicts the extensive game form  C; output of the algorithm, that OSP-
implements the generalized median voter scheme associated to C.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
1 x2
x1
x1
1 2 3 4 5
1
2 3 4 5
x1 x2 x1 x1
x2 x2 x2 x3 x3
x2 x1 x1 x2 x2 x2
x1 x2 x2 x1 x1
x2 x2 x2 x3 x3
x3 x3 x3 x2 x2 x2
Figure 2
Two comments about Figure 2 are pertinent. First, at the beginning of the game,
player 1 plays twice in a row with the same set of actions. The game without the rst
node is strategically equivalent to  C. We have maintained this potential redundancy in
order to be consistent with the denition of the general algorithm which distinguishes
between agent i, who moves rst in Stage I, and the rst agent to move in  x, who
moves just after i has chosen x+1; in the example, these two agents coincide (both are
player 1) but in general they may be di¤erent. Second, the example may help to clarify
the role of the (InIn) property to guarantee that truth-telling is obviously dominant as
well as why Stage A.2 (in Stage Up.k) of  x has to be modied, and the special role
given to player ix (player 2 in the example).16 In Figure 2, and to see why truth-telling
is an obviously dominant strategy in  x for any i 2 f1; 3; 4g, consider is choice at any
history where i plays (the case i = 5 is trivial). If is top coincides with the alternative
that i can induce as nal outcome, then truth-telling is obviously dominant since the
worse outcome is the top. If is top does not coincide with the alternative that i can
induce as nal outcome, then truth-telling is obviously dominant since the worse outcome
it induces coincides with the outcome of not truth-telling. Consider now agent 2 (in the
role of player ix1) who plays rst in Stage A.2 (in Stage Up.1) in the modied  x1.
16The truth-telling strategies here consist of choosing always the preferred alternative on the set of
available actions, either fx1; x2g or fx2; x3g.
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Observe that, despite the fact that none of 2s actions induces a terminal node, truth-
telling is obviously dominant. If 2 chooses x1, x3 is not a possible outcome because  x2
is not played after 2 chooses x1. Moreover, when 2 chooses x2; and  x2 is played, x1 is
not a possible outcome but, at the same time, 2 has the power to avoid x3. Otherwise, x3
could be the worse outcome if 2; with the single-peaked preference x2P2x1P2x3 chooses x2
(i.e., truth-tells) while x2 could be the best outcome after choosing x1. Condition (b) of
the (InIn) property guarantees that 2 is a minimal winning coalition at x2 and so, 2 can
impose x2 (i.e., avoid x3) after choosing x2. When agent 2s preference is x1P2x2P2x3,
x2P2x3P2x1 or x3P2x2P2x1, x2 is the worse outcome of truth-telling and the best of not
doing so. Thus, truth-telling is obviously dominant for 2. 
We are now ready to state Theorem 2, the second main result of the paper. Theorem
2 implies the su¢ ciency part of Theorem 1 but, in addition, it gives for each obviously
strategy-proof SCF an extensive game form that OSP-implements it.
Theorem 2 Let f : PN ! X be a generalized median voter scheme whose associated
coalition system C = fCxgx2X satises the increasing intersection property. Then,  C
implements f in obviously dominant strategies.
Proof See the Appendix.
6 Particular results: the two-alternative case and/or
anonymity
We apply our results to special cases of our setting, those in which X only contains two
alternatives and/or the SCFs are anonymous.
Assume jXj = 2 and, without loss of generality, let X = fx; x + 1g. Then, the set
P of single-peaked preferences over X is the universal domain of (strict) preferences over
fx; x + 1g: Let f : PN ! fx; x + 1g be a strategy-proof and onto SCF (i.e., it is not
constant) and let fCx; Cx+1g be its associated coalition system. By (1.3) in Remark 1,
fCx; Cx+1g trivially satises condition (b) of the (InIn) property. Hence, we obtain as a
corollary of our results the characterization of all obviously strategy-proof and onto SCFs
for the two-alternative case.
Corollary 1 Assume X = fx; x + 1g. Then, a social choice function f : PN ! X is
obviously strategy-proof and onto if and only if the committee Cx associated to f satises
condition (a) of the (InIn) property at x. Moreover, the extensive game form  x, outcome
of the algorithm applied to Cx, implements f in obviously dominant strategies.
Corollary 1 helps to further clarify the boundary between Bade and Gonczarowski
(2017) and our work. We can present in an unied way the two-alternative result and
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the single-peaked result into a sole result about single-peaked preferences. Bade and
Gonczarowski (2017) cannot do this, as their single-peaked result is for innite sets of
alternatives. For this reason, they have to treat the two cases separately (their Theorem
4.1 refers to the two-alternative case). In addition to the fact that the approaches of
the two papers are di¤erent,17 this is an additional evidence that the results of the two
independent papers are distinct and complement each other well.
A committee Cx is anonymous if Cx = fS 2 2N j jSj  qg for some q 2 f1; : : : ; ng.
The associated anonymous SCF and Cx itself are named voting by quota q (see Barberà,
Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991)). The two special and extreme cases q = n and q = 1
correspond to the two unanimity cases. Unanimity for x when q = n (i.e., to be elected,
x needs n votes) and unanimity for x + 1 when q = 1 (i.e., to be elected, x + 1 needs n
votes). Among all voting by quota, these two extreme cases are the unique ones for which
condition (a) of the (InIn) property holds at x. Indeed, if q = 1; then kx = 1 and jI1xj = 0:
If q = n; then kx = n and, for all 1  k  n; Ikx  = n > k   1: In contrast, if n > 2
and 1 < q < n; then kx = q and, for all 1 < k  q, Ikx  = 0 < k   1; hence, condition
(a) of the (InIn) property does not hold at x. We state as corollary of our results the
following characterization of all obviously strategy-proof, anonymous, and onto SCFs for
the two-alternative case.
Corollary 2 Assume X = fx; x + 1g. Then, a social choice function f : PN ! X is
obviously strategy-proof, anonymous and onto if and only if f is either voting by quota 1
or voting by quota n:
The reason of why voting by quota 1 is obviously strategy-proof is as follows. Let  x
be the extensive game form that OSP-implements voting by quota 1. When agent i has to
move, i has two choices: voting for x (i.e., vetoing x+1), and so ending the game with x,
or voting for x+1, and so passing to the next agent in the sequence (if any) the power to
impose x: If i prefers x, truth-telling (voting for x) gives to i the top alternative, at least
as preferred as the outcome of not truth-telling. If i prefers x+1, not truth-telling (voting
for x) gives to i the worse alternative, indi¤erent or less preferred to the outcome of truth-
telling (voting for x + 1). Hence, truth-telling is obviously dominant. Symmetrically for
voting by quota n: The reason of why any voting by quota 1 < q < n is not obviously
strategy-proof is as follows. Let   be an extensive game form that induces voting by quota
q. Look at the rst agent (called i) who has available a set of two actions.18 None of them
can be decisive (both have to leave as possible outcomes x and x+1), as otherwise   would
not induce voting by quota q. Hence, the other agents can always impose both outcomes
17Bade and Gonczarowski (2017) gives revelation principle like results while our approach, based on
the algorithm, identies for each obviously strategy-proof and onto SCF an extensive game form that
implements it in obviously dominant strategies.
18By Bade and Gonczarowski (2017), this simplication can be done without loss of generality.
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on i; irrespective of ichoice. Thus, the worse possible outcome of is truth-telling strategy
is strictly worse than the best possible outcome of any alternative strategy. Hence, voting
by quota 1 < q < n is not obviously strategy-proof.
As a consequence of our results, we nally obtain Corollary 3 characterizing the class
of all obviously strategy-proof, anonymous and onto SCFs on the domain of single-peaked
preferences over an arbitrary nite set of alternatives X = f1; : : : ;Mg, with M  2. The
result follows as a consequence of two observations. By Corollary 2, condition (a) of the
(InIn) property requires that, for all x 2 f1; : : : ;M   1g, Cx is either voting by quota 1
or voting by quota n (observe that CmM = ff1g; : : : ; fngg is voting by quota 1). Moreover,
outcome monotonicity of the coalition system requires that it should exists x 2 X such
that, for all x < x (if any), Cx is voting by quota n and, for all x  x, Cx is voting by
quota 1. Namely,
Corollary 3 A social choice function f : PN ! X is obviously strategy-proof, anony-
mous and onto if and only if f is a generalized median voter scheme whose associated
coalition system fCxgx2X has the property that there exists x 2 X such that (i) for all
1  x < x (if any), Cmx = fNg and (ii) for all x  x M , Cmx = ff1g; : : : ; fngg:
Note that if M = 2, then x = 1 corresponds to the case of voting by quota 1 and
x = 2 corresponds to the case of voting by quota n. Figure 3 below represents one of
those anonymous generalized median voter schemes for the case where M = 5, n = 3 and
x = x3. For each x 2 X, Cmx is depicted on the top of x:
r r r r r
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
f1; 2; 3g f1; 2; 3g f3g
f2g
f1g
f3g
f2g
f1g
f3g
f2g
f1g
Figure 3
Observe that in general, the two cases x = 1 and x = M correspond to the SCFs
that select the minimum and maximum top alternative, respectively. Corollary 3 says that
there are still other obviously strategy-proof, anonymous and onto SCFs di¤erent of these
two extremes. For instance, in the example depicted in Figure 3, at any P = (P1; P2; P3)
with the property that t(P ) = (x1; x4; x5); f(P ) = x3 is neither the maximum nor the
minimum top alternative but f is somehow simple, and far of being a dictatorship. In
fact, f can be described as follows: f(P ) is the maximum top, as long as all tops are
below x3; f(P ) is the minimum top, as long as all tops are above x3; and f(P ) = x3, as
long as there are tops below and above x3.
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7 Conclusion
For the class of social choice problems where a set of agents have to select an alternative
from a nite and linearly ordered set of alternatives over which agents have single-peaked
preferences, we have characterized the set of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social
choice functions. Our contribution is to identify the (InIn) property as being necessary and
su¢ cient for OSP-implementation. Moreover, we use the property to dene an algorithm
that for each obviously strategy-proof social choice function delivers an extensive game
form that OSP-implements it. This is in contrast with a major part of the literature on
obvious strategy-proofness containing revelation principle like results.
The (InIn) property is restrictive and substantially reduces the class of strategy-proof
social choice functions in this setting. Often, apparently a simple mechanism (e.g., in the
two-alternative case, voting by quota q when 1 < q < n) that seems to suggest that truth-
telling is clearly dominant, nonetheless the mechanism is not obviously strategy-proof.
Our paper conrms the conviction that obvious strategy-proofness is a very restrictive
notion. However, our companion paper (Arribillaga, Massó and Neme (2019)) indicates
that in another setting this is not necessarily the case; e.g., when alternatives have private
components, OSP may not have any additional bite at all. This means that for each
specic setting a particular analysis has to be carried out. Our two papers are two
examples of those, each with two extreme and di¤erent conclusions: restrictive in the
public-good case and not at all in the private-good case.
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Appendix
We start with the proof of Theorem 2 since it implies the su¢ ciency part of Theorem
1. Observe that Theorem 2 does not only guarantee that a generalized median voter
scheme that satises the (InIn) property is obviously strategy-proof but it also says that
the extensive game form dened in Subsection 5.2 OSP-implements it.
We state a remark that will be used in the sequel.
Remark 2 Let C = fCxgx2X be a coalition system that satises the (InIn) property
and let x 2 X. Then, the following statements hold.
(a) Assume x  x. Then, fig 2 Cmx if and only if i 2 I1x [ F 1x :
(b) If S 2 Cmx is such that jSj  2, then ix 2 S:
(c) If 1 < kx and x  x < x0, then fixg 2 Cmx0 .
(d) If x0 < x  x, then ix 1 2 I1x0.
(e) If x < x, then I1x+1 [ fixg  S for every S 2 Cmx :
(f) If F k
x
x 6= ;, then
Cmx = fS  N j S = Ikx [ fig for some 1  k  kx and i 2 F kx g: (3)
(g) If F k
x
x = ;, then
Cmx = fS  N j S = Ikx [ fig for some 1  k  kx   1 and i 2 F kx g [ fIk
x
x g: (4)
(h) jCmx j = 1 if and only if I1x 2 Cmx :
We now argue why the statements of Remark 2 hold.
To see that (a) holds, notice that x  x together with outcome monotonicity of C
imply that Cmx contains at least one singleton coalition. Hence, either I1x is a singleton
set and Cmx = fI1xg, in which case F 1x = ;, or else I1x = ; . Then, by denition of F 1x ; the
statement follows.
Statement (b) holds because, by hypothesis, kx > 1 and, by the denitions of ix and
I2x, i
x 2 I2x and I2x  S.
Statement (c) holds because, by hypothesis, I1x = ; and so, by outcome monotonicity
of the coalition system, I1x+1 = ;. By condition (b) of the (InIn) property, fixg 2 Cmx+1
and, by outcome monotonicity of the coalition system, fixg 2 Cmx0 if x < x0.
Statement (d) holds because, by denition of x, kx 1 > 1. By the denition of
ix 1 and condition (b) of the (InIn) property, ix 1 2 I2x 1. By denition of x and the
hypothesis x0 < x  x; I1x 1 = I2x 1 and I1x0 = I2x0 hold. By outcome monotonicity of the
coalition system, I1x 1  I1x0 : Hence, ix 1 2 I1x0.
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To see that (e) holds, assume x < x. By denition of x, kx > 1: Let S 2 Cmx be
arbitrary. Notice rst that I2x  S and ix 2 I2x; and so ix 2 S: Second, by outcome
monotonicity of the coalition system, S 2 Cx+1: Hence, I1x+1  S. Thus, I1x+1 [ fixg  S:
Statement (f) holds because the fact that Cmx includes the set in the right side of (3)
follows from the denition of F kx : To see that the other inclusion in (3) holds as well, let
S 2 Cmx and set k = jSj : Observe that F kxx 6= ; implies that there exists S 0 2 Cmx such
that jS 0j  k; and so Ikx ( S and, by condition (a) of the (InIn) property,
Ikx  = k   1:
By the denition of F kx ; there exists i 2 F kx such that S = Ikx [ fig:
To see that (g) holds, observe rst that F k
x
x = ; implies Ikxx 2 Cmx : Now, the fact
that the union of the two sets in the right side of (4) is included in Cmx follows from the
denition of F kx : To see that the other inclusion in (4) holds as well, let S 2 Cmx and set
k = jSj : If k < kx; the inclusion follows by the same argument used to show that (f)
holds. If k = kx; F k
x
x = ; implies S = Ikxx and so S belongs to the union of the two sets.
Statement (h) follows immediately from the denition of I1x.
Proof of Theorem 2 Let f : PN ! X be a generalized median voter scheme whose
associated coalition system C = fCxgx2X satises the (InIn) property. Let  C be the
extensive game form obtained by the algorithm dened in Subsection 5.2. For each P 2
PN , dene the prole of truth-telling strategies P = (P11 ; : : : ; Pnn ) in  C as follows. For
each i 2 N; let h be a history with the property that N (h) = i. Suppose h is a history in
Stage I (namely, h = ; and i = i). Then,
Pii (h) =
8><>:
x   1 if x > 1 and t(Pi)  x   1
x if t(Pi) = x
x + 1 if x < M and t(Pi)  x + 1:
Suppose h is a history in Stage Up.k or in Stage Down.k, for some k  1. Then,
Pii (h) =
(
x if t(Pi)  x
x+ 1 if t(Pi)  x+ 1;
where x = x + k   1 if h belongs to Stage Up.k and x = x   k if h belongs to Stage
Down.k. Namely, Pii chooses always the best available action according to Pi.
We prove Theorem 2 by showing that, for each prole P 2 PN , the following two
statements hold.
(I.a) f(P ) = o(h 
C
(P )).
(I.b) P is weakly dominant in  C:
Proof of (I.a) Let P = (P1; : : : ; Pn) 2 PN be an arbitrary prole and let o(h C(P ))
be the outcome of the extensive game form  C when agents play it according to P : We
will distinguish among three cases depending on whether h 
C
(P ) is a terminal history in
Stage I, Stage Up.k (for some k  1) or Stage Down.k (for some k  1).
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Case I: Assume h 
C
(P ) is a terminal history in Stage I. Then, x = o(h C(P )): Let
i = N (;) be the agent that has chosen the terminal action x in Stage I (namely, i = i).
By the denition of P , t(Pi) = x: Since fig 2 Cmx ; f(P )  x: If x = 1; f(P ) = x
and so f(P ) = o(h 
C
(P )). Assume now x > 1: By the denition of x, Cmx 1 does not
contain any singleton coalition. By denition, i = ix
 1 2 I2x 1. Therefore, i 2 S for all
S 2 Cx 1: Since t(Pi) = x; f(P )  x: Hence, f(P ) = x and so f(P ) = o(h C(P )).
Case II: Assume h 
C
(P ) is a terminal history in Stage Up.k for some k  1: Let
x = x + (k   1): By denition of  C, o(h C(P )) 2 fx; x+ 1g:
We rst show that
f(P ) 2 fx; x+ 1g:
We start by showing that f(P )  x; which is immediate if x = 1: Consider the case
x > 1: When considering the reasons why  C has reached Stage Up.k we distinguish
between the cases k = 1 and k > 1:
Assume k = 1, i.e., x = x. By construction of  C, agent ix
 1 has chosen x + 1 in
Stage I. Since ix 1 is playing according to the truth-telling strategy, t(Pix 1)  x + 1:
Since ix
 1 2 I2x 1 and, by denition of x, Cmx 1 has no minimal winning coalition of
cardinality equal to one, f(P )  x = x:
Assume k > 1, i.e., x > x. We distinguish between the two cases in Stage Up.k-1
that lead  C to reach Stage Up.k. Suppose kx 1 > 1 and so I1x 1 = ;: Since  C has reached
Stage Up.k, each agent i 2 F 1x 1[fix 1g has chosen x when playing (the modied)  x 1
in Stage Up.k-1: By the denition of P , t(Pi)  x for all i 2 F 1x 1 [ fix 1g: Then,
by (a) and (b) in Remark 2; f(P )  x: Suppose kx 1 = 1. Since  C has reached Stage
Up.k, each agent i 2 I1x 1 [ F 1x 1 has chosen x when playing (the modied)  x 1 in
Stage Up.k-1; because the outcome of  x 1 must be x: Therefore, by the denition of
P , t(Pi)  x for all i 2 I1x 1 [ F 1x 1: Since kx 1 = 1 holds, by (f) and (g) in Remark 2,
S 2 Cmx 1 if and only if S = fig for some i 2 I1x 1 [ F 1x 1: Then, f(P )  x: Hence, and
independently of whether kx 1 > 1 or kx 1 = 1,
f(P )  x: (5)
We now proceed by showing that f(P )  x + 1; which is immediate if x + 1 = M:
Consider the case x+1 < M . We distinguish between the two circumstances under which
 C has ended in Stage Up.k. Suppose kx > 1. Since x  x, by outcome monotonicity
of C, Cmx contains at least a minimal winning coalition of cardinality equal to one and so,
by assumption, I1x = ;: Therefore, there exists { 2 F 1x [ fixg that has chosen x in  x; i.e.,
t(P{)  x: Therefore, by (a) and (c) in Remark 2, either f{g 2 Cmx (and f(P ) = x) or
f{g 2 Cx+1 (i.e., { = ix and f(P )  x + 1). Therefore, f(P )  x + 1: Suppose kx = 1.
Since  C has ended in Stage Up.k, at least one i 2 I1x[F 1x has chosen x in  x: Therefore,
by the denition of P , t(Pi)  x for at least one i 2 I1x [ F 1x : By (f) and (g) in Remark
30
2, S 2 Cmx if and only if S = fig for some i 2 I1x [ F 1x : Then, f(P )  x: Hence, and
independently of whether kx > 1 or kx = 1,
f(P )  x+ 1: (6)
Thus, by (5) and (6),
f(P ) 2 fx; x+ 1g: (7)
Consider now (the modied)  x played in Stage Up.k. By hypothesis, o(h C(P )) is
the outcome of  x when agents play it according to P :We show that f(P ) = o(h 
C
(P ))
by distinguishing between two cases.
First assume that the outcome of (the modied)  x takes place in Stage A.k, with
1  k  kx. This implies that IkxnIk 1x 6= ;, o(h C(P )) = x + 1 and the following two
conditions hold.
(1.A) There exists i 2 IkxnIk 1x that has chosen x+ 1, i.e., x+ 1  t(Pi):
(2.A) For all k0 < k, each i 2 F k0x has chosen x+ 1, i.e., x+ 1  t(Pi):
Let S 2 Cmx be such that jSj  k: Then Ikx  S; and by (1.A) above, there exists i 2 S
such that x+ 1  t(Pi): Thus, there is no S 2 Cmx such that jSj  k and t(Pi)  x for all
i 2 S.
Let S 2 Cmx be such that jSj = k < k: Then, as k < k  kx, by (f) and (g) in Remark
2, S = Ikx [ fig for some i such that i 2 F kx : By (2.A) above, there exists i 2 S such that
x+ 1  t(Pi): Thus, there is no S 2 Cmx such that jSj < k and t(Pi)  x for all i 2 S.
Therefore, f(P )  x+ 1. By (7), f(P ) = x+ 1 and so f(P ) = o(h C(P )):
Assume now that the outcome of (the modied)  x takes place in Stage B.k, with
1  k  kx: We proceed by distinguishing among several cases and subcases.
Case 1: k < kx: Then, F kx nF k 1x 6= ;, o(h C(P )) = x and the following two conditions
hold.
(1.B.1) There exists { 2 F kx nF k 1x that has chosen x, i.e., t(P{)  x:
(2.B.1) Each i 2 Ikx has chosen x, i.e., t(Pi)  x:
By denition of F kx ; it holds that for agent { identied in (1.B.1), I
k
x [ f{g 2 Cmx : By
(1.B.1) and (2.B.1), t(Pi)  x for all i 2 Ikx [f{g; implying that f(P )  x. Hence, by (7),
f(P ) = x and so f(P ) = o(h 
C
(P )):
Case 2: k = kx: The following two conditions hold.
(1.B.2) Each i 2 Ikxx has chosen x, i.e., t(Pi)  x:
(2.B.2) For all k0 < kx; each i 2 F k0x has chosen x+ 1, i.e., x+ 1  t(Pi):
Subcase 2.1: F kx nF k 1x 6= ;: We distinguish between two cases.
Subcase 2.1.1: There exists { 2 F kx n F k 1x that has chosen x, i.e., t(P{)  x. Then,
o(h 
C
(P )) = x. By denition of F kx ; I
k
x [ f{g 2 Cmx : By (1.B.2), t(Pi)  x for all
i 2 Ikx [f{g; implying that f(P )  x. Hence, by (7), f(P ) = x and so f(P ) = o(h C(P )):
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Subcase 2.1.2: Each i 2 F kx nF k 1x has chosen x+1, i.e., x+1  t(Pi) for all i 2 F kx nF k 1x .
Then, o(h 
C
(P )) = x + 1: By condition (2.B.2), for all k0  kx, each i 2 F k0x has chosen
x + 1: By (f) in Remark 2, there is no S 2 Cmx such that t(Pi)  x for all i 2 S: Thus,
x+ 1  f(P ). Hence, by (7), f(P ) = x+ 1 and so f(P ) = o(h C(P )):
Case 2.2: F kx nF k 1x = ;: By (2), we distinguish only between two cases.
Subcase 2.2.1: F k
x
x = ;: Then, o(h C(P )) = x: By (g) in Remark 2, Ikxx 2 Cmx ; which
implies, by (1.B.2) above, that f(P )  x: Hence, by (7), f(P ) = x and so f(P ) =
o(h 
C
(P )):
Subcase 2.2.2: F k
x
x = F
kx 1
x 6= ;; Then, o(h C(P )) = x + 1. Condition (2.B.2) implies
that, for all k0  kx, each i 2 F k0x has chosen x+1: By (f) in Remark 2, there is no S 2 Cmx
such that t(Pi)  x for all i 2 S: Thus, x + 1  f(P ): Hence, by (7), f(P ) = x + 1 and
so f(P ) = o(h 
C
(P )):
Case III: Assume h 
C
(P ) is a terminal history in Stage Down.k for some k  1: Let
x = x   k: By denition of  C, o(h C(P )) 2 fx; x+ 1g:
We rst show that
f(P ) 2 fx; x+ 1g:
We start be showing that f(P )  x + 1, which is immediate if x + 1 = M: Consider
the case x + 1 < M: When considering the reasons why  C has reached Stage Down.k
we distinguish between the cases k = 1 and k > 1:
Assume k = 1, i.e., x = x 1: By construction of  C, agent ix 1 has chosen x 1 in
Stage I. Since ix 1 is playing according to the truth-telling strategy, t(Pix 1)  x   1:
Since fix 1g 2 Cmx (see footnote 13), f(P )  x = x+ 1:
Assume k > 1, i.e., x < x   1: We distinguish between the two cases in Stage
Down.k-1 that lead  C to reach Stage Down.k. Suppose
Cmx+1 > 1: Since  C has
moved to Stage Down.k, each agent i 2 I1x+1 [ fixg has chosen x + 1 when playing
(the modied)  x+1 in Stage Down.k-1. By denition of P , t(Pi)  x + 1 for all
i 2 I1x+1 [ fixg. Since x + 1 < x; kx+1 > 1: By condition (b) of the (InIn) property,
I1x+1 [ fixg 2 Cmx+1 holds, and then f(P )  x + 1: Suppose
Cmx+1 = 1: Then, in Stage
Down.k-1 the outcome of  x+1 is x+1, which means that each i 2 I1x+1 has chosen x+1
in  x+1: By denition of P , t(Pi)  x + 1 for all i 2 I1x+1: Since
Cmx+1 = 1; by (h) in
Remark 2, I1x+1 2 Cmx+1, and then f(P )  x + 1: Hence, and independently of whetherCmx+1 > 1 or Cmx+1 = 1,
f(P )  x+ 1: (8)
We now proceed by showing that f(P )  x; which is immediate if x = 1: Consider the
case 1 < x: We distinguish between the two circumstances under which  C has ended at
Stage Down.k. Suppose jCmx j > 1: Then, there exists { 2 I1x[fix 1g that has chosen x+1
when playing (the modied)  x in Stage Down.k. By denition of P , t(P{)  x + 1.
By (e) in Remark 2, there is no S 2 Cmx 1 such that t(Pi)  x  1 for all i 2 S; and then
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f(P )  x: Suppose jCmx j = 1: Then, in Stage Down.k the outcome of  x is x+ 1: Then,
since jCmx j = 1, by (h) in Remark 2, there exists { 2 I1x that has chosen x+1 when playing
 x in Stage Down.k. By denition of P , t(P{)  x+1. By (h) in Remark 2, Cmx = fI1xg
holds, and so there is no S 2 Cmx such that t(Pi)  x for all i 2 S; and then f(P )  x:
Hence, and independently of whether jCmx j > 1 or jCmx j = 1,
f(P )  x: (9)
Thus, by (8) and (9),
f(P ) 2 fx; x+ 1g: (10)
Now, the proof that f(P ) = o(h 
C
(P )) follows as in Case II.
Proof of (I.b) We show that, for each i 2 N and Pi 2 P, the strategy Pii is weakly
dominant in  C. Fix i 2 N and Pi 2 P, and let 0i 6= Pii be arbitrary. We consider three
cases depending on the stage at which 0i chooses for the rst time an action di¤erent
from the one that Pii would choose.
Case 1: Assume 0i chooses a di¤erent action than 
Pi
i in Stage I, i.e., N (;) = i = i and
0i(;) 6= Pii (;): We distinguish among three cases.
Subcase 1.1: t(Pi) = x: Then, 
Pi
i chooses x
, the outcome of  C is x and so Pii is
trivially weakly dominant.
Subcase 1.2: t(Pi)  x+1. Then, Pii chooses x+1. By (c) in Remark 2, fig 2 Cmx0 for all
x0  x. Hence, the outcome of  C is greater than or equal to x and smaller than or equal
to t(Pi). Furthermore, 0i(;) 2 fx   1; xg in Stage I and so the outcome of  C when i
plays according to 0i is smaller than or equal to x
. Hence, since Pi is single-peaked, 
Pi
i
is weakly dominant:
Subcase 1.3: t(Pi)  x   1. Then, Pii chooses x   1. By (d) in Remark 2, i 2 I1x0 for
all x0 < x. Hence, the outcome of  C is smaller than or equal to x   1 and larger than
or equal to t(Pi). Furthermore, 0i(;) 2 fx; x + 1g in Stage I and so the outcome of  C
when i plays according to 0i is larger than or equal to x
. Hence, since Pi is single-peaked,
Pii is weakly dominant:
Case 2: Assume 0i chooses a di¤erent action than 
Pi
i in Stage Up.k for some k  1.
Let x = x + (k   1). We distinguish between two cases.
Subcase 2.1: i 2 Ikxx . Observe two things. First, Ikx  Ikxx for all 1  k  kx and i plays
in some Stage A.k0 for some k0  1 in (the modied)  x: We distinguish between two
cases.
Subcase 2.1.1: t(Pi)  x. Then, Pii chooses x in (the modied)  x: We distinguish
between the cases kx = 1 and kx > 1:
Assume kx = 1. Then, since i 2 Ikxx , ffigg = Cmx and the outcome of  C is x. Since 0i
chooses x+ 1; the outcome of  C is now larger than or equal to x+ 1: Hence, since Pi is
single-peaked, Pii weakly dominates 
0
i.
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Assume kx > 1. Since i plays in Stage A.k0 for some k0  1, agent i; and every agent
j 2 Ikxx that has played before i; have chosen x: Hence, when i plays according to Pii ,  C
ends with the outcome of  x, which is either x or x+1; regardless of whether or not i = ix:
In contrast, when i plays according to 0i; i chooses x + 1 and then the outcome of  
C is
greater than or equal to x+1: Hence, since Pi is single-peaked, 
Pi
i weakly dominates 
0
i.
Subcase 2.1.2: t(Pi)  x + 1: Then, Pii chooses x + 1 in (the modied)  x; and the
outcome of  C is greater than or equal to x+ 1: We distinguish between the cases i = ix
and i 6= ix. Suppose i = ix. Then, by (c) in Remark 2, fig 2 Cx0 for all x0 > x, the
outcome of  C is smaller than or equal to t(Pi). Suppose i 6= ix. Since agent i plays x+1
in Stage A.k and agent ix has chosen x and fixg 2 Cx+1, the outcome of  C is x + 1.
Now, and independently of whether i = ix or i 6= ix, 0i chooses x and the outcome of  C
is x or x+ 1. Hence, since Pi is single-peaked, 
Pi
i weakly dominates 
0
i:
Subcase 2.2: i 2 F k0x n F k0 1x for k0  k. Observe that i plays in some Stage B.k0 for some
k0  1 in (the modied)  x: We distinguish between two cases.
Subcase 2.2.1: t(Pi)  x: Then, Pii chooses x in (the modied)  x and the outcome of
 C is x. Furthermore, 0i chooses x+ 1 and the outcome of  
C is greater than or equal to
x. Hence, since Pi is single-peaked, 
Pi
i weakly dominates 
0
i:
Subcase 2.2.2: t(Pi)  x+1:We distinguish between the cases k0 = 1 and k0 > 1: Suppose
k0 = 1: Then, i 2 F 1x implies fig 2 Cmx0 for x0  x: Since Pii chooses x+1 in (the modied)
 x, the outcome of  C is larger than or equal to x and smaller than or equal to t(Pi):
Suppose k0 > 1: Then, ix has chosen x in  x and so the outcome of  C is either x or x+1:
Hence, and independently of whether k0 = 1 or k0 > 1, 0i chooses x and then the outcome
of  C is x. Hence, since Pi is single-peaked, 
Pi
i is weakly dominant.
Case 3: Assume 0i chooses a di¤erent action than 
Pi
i in Stage Down.k for some k  1:
This case is similar to Case 2, replacing the role of (c) by (d) in Remark 2, and therefore
its proof is omitted. 
Proof of Theorem 1 The su¢ ciency part follows from Theorem 2.
To prove necessity, assume f : PN ! X is obviously strategy-proof and onto. By
Corollary 1 in Li (2017), f is strategy-proof. By Barberà, Gül and Stacchetti (1993), f
is a generalized median voter scheme. Let fCxgx2X be the coalition system associated to
f . We have to show that fCxgx2X satises the (InIn) property. To do so we will use the
fact that, similarly to what happens with SP-implementability, OSP-implementability is
a hereditary property in the following sense. If f is OSP-implementable in a domain, then
the restriction of f on any of its subdomains is also OSP-implementable.19
The subdomains that we will consider are those obtained by considering subsets of
single-peaked preferences over two or at most three consecutive alternatives in X, with
19The proof of Proposition 5 in Li (2017) contains this observation.
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tops on one of those alternatives. We now show that condition (a) of the (InIn) property
holds for every x < M . Fix x 2 f1; : : : ;M 1g, denote by Px the set of the two preferences
over fx; x + 1g and consider the generalized median voter scheme f : PNx ! fx; x + 1g
dened by the coalition system C = fCx; Cx+1g, where Cx = Cx and Cx+1 = ffig j i 2
Ng: Since f is obviously strategy-proof so is f .20 As we have already mentioned in
the Introduction, Bade and Gonczarowski (2017) show that to OSP-implement f one can
restrict attention only to proto-dictatorship mechanisms (see also the proof of Proposition
1 in Arribillaga, Massó and Neme (2016)). That is, we can assume that the extensive game
form that OSP-implements f has the following properties. Agents play sequentially, at
most once, and have to choose either x or x+1. Moreover, they are grouped into alternate
subsets in which each agent has either the choice between implementing x (by choosing it)
or letting the game continue (by choosing x+1) or the choice between implementing x+1
(by choosing it) or letting the game continue (by choosing x), except the last player in the
sequence who has the choice between implementing x (by choosing x) or implementing
x+ 1 (by choosing x+ 1).
Let X1 be the rst group of agents in the sequence that can implement x or let the
game continue. Let Y1 be the second group of agents in the sequence that play after
the agents in X1, and can implement x + 1 or let the game continue. In general, for
t 2 f2; : : : ; tg; let Xt the group of agents in the sequence that play after the agents in
Yt 1, and can implement x or let the game continue. Let Yt the group of agents in the
sequence that play after the agents in Xt, and can implement x + 1 or let the game
continue. Finally, let bj be the last agent in the sequence that plays after the agents in Yt,
and can implement either x or x+ 1. Hence, the order of play of the subsets of agents is
given by X1; Y1; X2; : : : ; Xt; Yt; Xt+1; : : : ; Xt; Yt;bj; and agents in each subset can play in
any order. Observe that X1 and/or Yt could be empty.
21
Since the proto-dictatorship OSP-implements f and Cx = Cx; it can be checked that
Cmx can be written as the following collection of subsets
Cmx = ffig j i 2 X1gSfS j S = btS
t=1
Yt [ fig s.t. i 2 Xbt+1 for some 1  bt  t  1gSf tS
t=1
Yt [ fbjgg:
If k = 1  kx; jI1xj  0 holds trivially. Let 1 < k  kx and bS 2 Cmx be such that bS  k and  bS  jSj for all S 2 Cmx such that jSj  k. That is, bS is one of the subsets
20Since generalized median voter schemes are tops only and onto, f is the restriction of f into the
subdomain PNx .
21Figure 1 in Example 2 represents the proto-dictatorship mechanism where t = 4 and X1 = f1g;
Y1 = f2g; X2 = f3; 4g; Y2 = f5g; X3 = f6g; Y3 = f7; 8g; X4 = f9g; Y4 = ; and bj = 10:
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with the smallest cardinality among all subsets in Cmx with cardinality larger than or equal
to k. Clearly, bS =2 ffig j i 2 X1g and let bt 2 f1; : : : ; tg be such that bS = btS
t=1
Yt [ fbig:
Observe that if S 2 Cmx and jSj  k; S =
t0S
t=1
Yt [ fig with t0  bt and i 2 Xt0+1 [ fbjg:
Then, Ikx =
btS
t=1
Yt and so
Ikx  =
 btSt=1Yt
   bS  1  k   1:
Now we show that condition (b) of the (InIn) property holds at x. Assume kx > 1.
Then, there exists S 2 Cmx such that jSj  2 and, by condition (a) of the (InIn) property
holds at x, I2x 6= ;: We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: x+1 =M: Then Cmx+1 = ffig j i 2 Ng and I1x+1 = ;. Therefore, I1x+1[fig 2 Cmx+1
for each i 2 I2x, which means that condition (b) of the (InIn) property holds at x.
Case 2: x+ 1 < M . We distinguish between two cases.
Subcase 2.1:
Cmx+1 = 1: Let fS 0g = Cmx+1, and so I1x+1 = S 0: By outcome monotonicity of
the coalition system, S 2 Cx+1 for all S 2 Cmx with jSj  2. Hence,
S 0 =
T
S2Cx+1
jSj2
S  T
S2Cmx
jSj2
S = I2x:
Then, there exists i 2 S 0  I2x such that S 0 [ fig = S 0 2 Cmx+1: Thus, condition (b) of the
(InIn) property holds at x:
Subcase 2.2:
Cmx+1 > 1: We distinguish between two cases.
Subcase 2.2.1: There exists j0 such that fj0g 2 Cmx+1: Dene eP1      ePn  eP  PN as
follows.
i) If fig 2 Cmx ; then ePi = fPi 2 P j t(Pi) 2 fx+ 1; x+ 2gg:
ii) If fig =2 Cmx ; then ePi = fPi 2 P j t(Pi) 2 fx; x+ 1; x+ 2gg:
Let ef be the restriction of f to the set of proles in eP. Since f is OSP-implementable,
so is ef . Let e  be an extensive game form that OSP-implements ef . From now on, we will
use a tilde to refer to the components of e , and set eN = N: Hence, for every P 2 eP ; there
exists P such that eo(he (P )) = ef(P ): For Pi 2 ePi; denote Pii by zi where t(Pi) = z:
Let j be the rst agent that has to play in e  (i.e., eN (;) = j). By Mackenzie (2018),
we can assume without loss of generality that j has at least two actions available at ;
(i.e.,
 eA(;)  2); that is,
zj(;) 6= z
0
j (;) (11)
for z; z0 2 fx; x+ 1; x+ 2g. We claim that j 2 I2x:
Claim 1 j 2 I2x:
Proof of Claim 1 Suppose otherwise. We distinguish between two cases, depending
on whether or not fjg is a minimal winning coalition at x.
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(1.i) fjg 2 Cmx : Since kx > 1; there exists S 2 Cmx such that jSj  2 and j =2 S: By the
denition of ePj, fjg 2 Cmx and (11), x+1j (;) 6= x+2j (;):
For each i 2 S and history h in e  such that eN (h) = i, dene
ei(h) = ( x+1i (h) if x+1j (;)  h
xi (h) if 
x+2
j (;)  h:
Since e  induces ef ,
eo(he (x+2 S fjg; eS; x+2j )) = eo(he (x+2 S fjg; xS; x+2j )) = ef(P x+2 S fjg; P xS ; P x+2j ) = x
and
eo(he (x+2 S fjg; eS; x+1j )) = eo(he (x+2 S fjg; x+1S ; x+1j )) = ef(P x+2 S fjg; P x+1S ; P x+1j ) = x+ 1:
By single-peakedness, (x+ 1)P x+2j x holds, which implies that 
x+2
j is not weakly domi-
nant. Hence, j 2 I2x if fjg 2 Cmx .
(1.ii) fjg =2 Cmx . Then, by our contradiction hypothesis stating that j =2 I2x, there exists
S 2 Cmx such that jSj  2 and j =2 S: By the denition of ePj; fjg =2 Cmx and (11), there
exists y 2 fx; x+ 1g such that yj (;) 6= x+2j (;):
For each i 2 S and history h in e  such that eN (h) = i, dene
ei(h) = ( x+1i (h) if yj (;)  h
xi (h) if 
x+2
j (;)  h:
Since e  induces ef ,
eo(he (x+2 S fjg; eS; x+2j )) = eo(he (x+2 S fjg; xS; x+2j )) = ef(P x+2 S fjg; P xS ; P x+2j ) = x
and
eo(he (x+2 S fjg; eS; yj )) = eo(he (x+2 S fjg; x+1S ; yj )) = ef(P x+2 S fjg; P x+1S ; P yj ) = x+ 1:
By single-peakedness, (x+ 1)P x+2j x holds, which implies that 
x+2
j is not weakly domi-
nant. Hence, j 2 I2x if fjg =2 Cmx , and this concludes the proof of Claim 1. 
To proceed with the proof for this Subcase 2.2.1, assume that condition (b) of the
(InIn) property does not hold at x. By Claim 1, j 2 I2x; and so I1x+1 [ fjg =2 Cmx+1: SinceCmx+1 > 1 and there exists j0 such that fj0g 2 Cmx+1; I1x+1 = ;; and so fjg =2 Cmx+1. By
outcome monotonicity of the coalition system, fjg =2 Cmx : By the denition of ePj; fjg =2 Cmx
and (11), there exists y 2 fx+ 1; x+ 2g such that xj (;) 6= yj (;):
For each i 6= j and history h in e  such that eN (h) = i, dene
ei(h) = ( x+2i (h) if xj (;)  h
x+1i (h) if 
y
j (;)  h:
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Since e  induces ef ,
eo(he (e j; xj )) = eo(he (x+2 j ; xj )) = ef(P x+2 j ; P xj ) = x+ 2
and eo(he (e j; yj )) = eo(he (x+1 j ; yj )) = ef(P x+1 j ; P yj ) = x+ 1:
By single-peakedness, (x+ 1)P xj (x+ 2) holds, which implies that 
x
j is not weakly domi-
nant. This contradiction implies that condition (b) of the (InIn) property holds at x for
the Subcase 2.2.1.
Subcase 2.2.2: There is no j0 such that fj0g 2 Cmx+1: By outcome monotonicity of the
coalition system, there is no j0 such that fj0g 2 Cmx : Hence, I1x+1 = I2x+1. Since condition
(a) of the (InIn) property holds at x+1, I1x+1 = I
2
x+1 6= ;: Dene eP1   ePn  eP  PN
as follows.
i) If i 2 I1x+1; then ePi = fPi 2 P j t(Pi) 2 fx; x+ 1gg:
ii) If i =2 I1x+1; then ePi = fPi 2 P j t(Pi) 2 fx; x+ 1; x+ 2gg:
Let ef be the restriction of f to the set of proles in eP. Since f is OSP-implementable,
so is ef . Let e  be an extensive game form that OSP-implements ef . Hence, for every
P 2 eP, there exists P such that eo(he (P )) = ef(P ): For Pi 2 ePi; denote Pii by zi where
t(Pi) = z:
Let j be the rst agent that has to play in e  (i.e., eN (;) = j). By Mackenzie (2018),
we can assume without loss of generality that j has at least two actions available at ;
(i.e.,
 eA(;)  2); that is,
zj(;) 6= z
0
j (;) (12)
for z; z0 2 fx; x+ 1; x+ 2g. We claim that j 2 I2x:
Claim 2 j 2 I2x:
Proof of Claim 2 Assume otherwise. Then, there exists S 2 Cmx such that jSj  2
and j =2 S: By outcome monotonicity of the coalition system, S 2 Cx+1, and so j =2 I1x+1:
By (12), there exists y 2 fx; x+ 1g such that yj (;) 6= x+2j (;):
For each i 2 S and history h in e  such that eN (h) = i, dene
ei(h) = ( x+1i (h) if yj (;)  h
xi (h) if 
x+2
j (;)  h:
Since e  induces ef ,
eo(he (x+1 S fjg; eS; x+2j )) = eo(he (x+1 S fjg; xS; x+2j )) = ef(P x+1 S fjg; P xS ; P x+2j ) = x
and
eo(he (x+1 S fjg; eS; yj )) = eo(he (x+1 S fjg; x+1S ; yj )) = ef(P x+1 S fjg; P x+1S ; P yj ) = x+ 1:
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By single-peakedness, (x+ 1)P x+2j x holds, which implies that 
x+2
j is not weakly domi-
nant. A contradiction. 
To proceed with the proof for this Subcase 2.2.2, assume that condition (b) of the
(InIn) property does not hold at x. Since by Claim 1, j 2 I2x;
I1x+1 [ fjg =2 Cmx+1: (13)
We distinguish between two cases, depending on whether or not j belongs to I1x+1:
(2.i) j 2 I1x+1: By (13), I1x+1 =2 Cmx+1: By (12), xj (;) 6= x+1j (;):
For each i =2 I1x+1 and history h in e  such that N (h) = i, dene
ei(h) = ( x+2i (h) if xj (;)  h
x+1i (h) if 
x+1
j (;)  h:
Since e  induces ef and I1x+1 =2 Cmx+1,
eo(he ((e I1x+1 fjg; x+1I1x+1 ; xj )) = eo(he ((x+2 I1x+1 fjg; x+1I1x+1 ; xj )) = ef(P x+2 I1x+1 fjg; P x+1I1x+1 ; P xj ) = x+2
and
eo(he (e I1x+1 fjg; x+1I1x+1 ; x+1j )) = eo(he (x+1 I1x+1 fjg; x+1I1x+1 ; x+1j )) = ef(P x+11 ; : : : ; P x+1n ) = x+1:
By single-peakedness, (x+ 1)P xj (x+ 2) holds, which implies that 
x
j is not weakly dom-
inant. A contradiction.
(2.ii) j =2 I1x+1: By (12), there exists y 2 fx+ 1; x+ 2g such that xj (;) 6= yj (;):
For every i =2 I1x+1 [ fjg and history h such that eN (h) = i, dene
ei(h) = ( x+2i (h) if xj (;)  h
x+1i (h) if 
y
j (;)  h:
Since e  induces ef and (13) holds,
eo(he (e I1x+1 fjg; x+1I1x+1 ; xj )) = eo(he (x+2 I1x+1 fjg; x+1I1x+1 ; xj )) = ef(P x+2 I1x+1 fjg; P x+1I1x+1 ; P xj ) = x+2
and
eo(he (e I1x+1 fjg; x+1I1x+1 ; yj )) = eo(he (x+1 I1x+1 fjg; x+1I1x+1 ; yj )) = ef(P x+1 I1x+1 fjg; P x+1I1x+1 ; P yj ) = x+1:
By single-peakedness, (x+ 1)P xj (x+ 2) holds, which implies that 
x
j is not weakly dom-
inant.
Thus, condition (b) of the (InIn) property holds at x. 
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